There is a current lack of human factors identification and analysis methods in computer and information security. Previous research has focused on micro-level issues, such as task analyses and usability studies of security methods such as smart cards, passwords, and biometric devices. The purpose of this research is to develop a framework for identifying human factors and organizational issues contributing to computer and information security vulnerabilities and breaches. This framework is applied in conjunction with technical security audits. The purpose of this research is to test, develop, and refine the proposed methodology. This study examines the methodology with known computer and information technical vulnerabilities through semi-structured interviews with network administrators. These interviews yielded results in the form of methodology refinements and developments and two case studies of technical security vulnerabilities, using what is called the Human Factors Vulnerability Analysis, or HFVA.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Human and organizational factors in computer and information security
Human factors and organizational issues are two of the greatest barriers to effective computer and information security (CIS), as well as one of the most understudied and least understood by researchers and practitioners. Many of the solutions and preventative measures to CIS problems are purely technically based. Currently, there are no human factors or organizational models to derive this concept, nor are there methodologies to systematically identify and provide frameworks for linking technical and social issues in computer and information security.
In a 2002 survey from the CSI/FBI, 503 computer security practitioners in U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial institutions, medical institutions, and universities were asked various questions on CIS (Power, 2002) . Ninety percent of the respondents detected computer security breaches within the last twelve months. Eighty percent acknowledged financial losses due to security breaches where 44% quantified their financial losses at $455,848,000. More respondents (74%) cited their Internet connection as a frequent point of attack than cited their internal systems as frequent point of attack (33%). Forty percent detected system penetration from the outside, 40% detected denial of service attacks, 78% detected employee abuse of Internet access privileges, and 85% detected computer viruses. These findings corroborated the increasing threat of CIS security breaches, and its financial toll on industry, and government.
There are two types of causes to the above-mentioned unauthorized uses of computer systems. There are "accidental" causes and "deliberate" causes. Accidental causes include "natural" causes, like power surges that damage computer systems, and "human", but unintentional, causes (Computer Science and Telecommunications Board-National Research Council, 2002) . The unintentional human causes may be called human error. An example of this may be a programming error causing the access levels to be given to users without the proper clearance. Deliberate causes are actions made by conscious choice, i.e. attacks. Attacks on a computer system may exploit the human errors introduced into the system. Inadequate system design and implementation resulting from the above mentioned errors create opportunities for malicious attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities, i.e. security breaches. Vulnerabilities may be thought of as a weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action (Howard & Longstaff, 1998) . In the CIS literature, security breaches may be thought of "attacks", which may be defined as a series of steps taken by an attacker to achieve an unauthorized result (Howard & Longstaff, 1998) .
There is very little research on human and organizational factors in computer security. Existing human factors research in CIS is limited and examines the human factors (e.g., usability, task demands) of computer security methods, such as passwords (Adams & Sasse, 1999) , encryption programs (Whitten & Tygar, 1998 and other computer security methods (Proctor, Lien, Salvendy, & Schultz, 2000) . While it is important to build and design more user-friendly computer security methods, this type of research does not address many of the human and organizational factors, such as operational and management security practices, human error, and organizational "awareness" related to security personnel actions (National Research Council Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2002) . More and better knowledge on human and organizational factors that can have an impact on CIS is needed, as well as new methodologies to aid in the intelligent analysis of CIS vulnerabilities and security breaches.
Human error research, work system theory, accident analysis in computer and information security
The cognitive and social sciences have developed extensive tools and taxonomies for systematically identifying and classifying human error in the context of organization and work place environments. These tools and taxonomies are used to not only identify and define an error, but to also link the organizational components directly or indirectly related to the cause of the said error. Human error may be defined as the failure of planned actions to achieve their desired endswithout the intervention of some unforeseeable event (Reason, 1990) . The field of human factors research has used the taxonomies of human error research in the areas of organizational accident analyses (Reason, 1997) and accident near-misses (van der Schaaf, 1991). Analysis of the organizational factors associated with or contributing to the error may help understand the factors needed to improve the current work system. This approach to improving safety may be thought of in the computer and information security context. Security breaches may be thought of as "accidents", i.e. a recognizable "event" in which the system is compromised and assets are lost. Computer and information vulnerabilities may be thought of as "near-misses", i.e. the accidents "waiting to happen".
Error taxonomies may be used to develop a framework for categorizing CIS vulnerabilities and breaches with human error components in the work system. A work system can be described as having five elements: the individual performing certain tasks using tools and technologies in a specific environment and under organizational conditions (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Smith & Carayon-Sainfort, 1989) . The application of human error taxonomies to understand accidental and deliberate causes of security problems links organizational components of the work system to computer system vulnerabilities and security breaches (Carayon & Kraemer, 2002) . This information can then be used for improving and redesigning the work system with the aim of building better defense mechanisms against CIS attacks.
A method for error diagnosis has been developed for incorporating the work system factors that account for errors contributing to accidents in safety-critical environments (Sutcliffe & Rugg, 1998) . This method employs the use of error taxonomies described in the above sections to progress through "layers" of diagnosis that address both the organizational and technical components of the accidents in human-computer systems. This model was chosen as foundation for the proposed methodology for the following reasons: (1) the method addresses both the reactionary analysis of an accident (in CIS, security breaches) and the preventative analysis of potential risk (in CIS, technical vulnerabilities); (2) this method recognizes the importance of how human error contributes to real or potential failures, and also addresses the organizational components contributing to the errors; and (3) the method acknowledges design issues surrounding the technical components of the human-computer system and the work system aspects of the failure.
HUMAN FACTORS VULNERABILITY EVALUATION
The proposed methodology, the Human Factors Vulnerability Analysis (HFVA), consists of three levels: identification, analysis, and solution. The first level, "identification", analyzes the vulnerability in terms of identifying from various angles. After properly identifying the components of the vulnerability, enough information is gathered to determine the direction the "analysis" will take. The technical and social pathways recognized in the analysis stage will posture the solutions and recommendations developed in the "solutions" level. Please refer to Figure 1 for the flowchart of the HFVA method.
METHOD AND RESULTS
The purpose of this research was to test, develop, and refine the proposed methodology. The design of this study is a pilot test of the HVFA methodology with known CIS technical vulnerabilities through semi-structured interviews with network administrators.
The HFVA is to be used in conjunction with a system-wide technical audit. The HFVA follows a technical vulnerability audit on a system or network, and is conducted upon vulnerabilities with human factors components. This research was done in collaboration with a team of researchers in computer sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Madison headed by Professor Mary Vernon, who were performing system-wide vulnerability audits. Technical vulnerability audits are done on networks and, in this case, the auditors used Nessus, a freeware security scanner. A security scanner is a software that will remotely audit a given network to determine if hackers may break into it, or misuse it in some way.
Five vulnerabilities were identified as having human factors components in two ways: (1) vulnerabilities that reappeared on subsequent audits after the technical "fix" had been implemented; and (2) vulnerabilities that were identified by the computer sciences team as having a human factors
component.
An open-ended interviewing method with four network administrators was used to evaluate the HFVA methodology on technical vulnerabilities. The data collection was conducted by the industrial engineering research assistant (first author). Each interview was audio taped and transcribed. Each question regarding the methodology was formed by the definition of each piece of the methodology. The transcribed interviews were then analyzed using a qualitative software package, QSR NVivo©. Responses to each piece of the methodology were coded by the above mentioned definitions with the software. Each interview was coded in this fashion. Each piece of interview information is coded once. The interview data coded at each piece of the methodology is aggregated, following the flow of the methodology.
This analysis yielded information on the difficulties of using HFVA including: unclear definitions (e.g., human versus technical error, design versus technical error), incomplete technical audit information, and the need to match the characteristics of the vulnerabilities with the working knowledge of the network administrators (one interviewee did not comment because of lack of knowledge of the chosen vulnerabilities, and two of five vulnerabilities were chosen for analysis by the administrators). Consistencies and inconsistencies in interviewee responses were also uncovered. These interviews also yielded two case studies on two technical vulnerabilities. One of the studies is discussed in the next section.
EXAMPLE OF SECURITY VULNERABILITY
Utilizing the Human Factors Vulnerability Analysis (HFVA), data was collected to develop a case study of the vulnerability upgrade for SSH version 1.2.32. This vulnerability appeared on two audits, where a "fix" was implemented after the first audit. Secure Shell, or SSH, is an encrypted remote access protocol. SSH or code based on SSH is used by many systems all over the world and in a wide variety of commercial applications. An integer-overflow bug in the CRC32 compensation attack detection code may allow remote attackers to write values to arbitrary locations in memory. SSH version 1.2.32 is a service-related vulnerability, where usability is unaffected, unless someone (attacker) finds it, creates a program to exploit it, and starts using it widely. The HFVA was used as a guide to uncover the human factors contributing to this vulnerability.
It is unknown when exactly the vulnerability was introduced into the system. This vulnerability had both technical and human factors components. There was a bug in the program, although the design of the program was appropriate for the purposes of the system. Administrators acknowledged human error components to the vulnerability, stating that ill-defined policies to act upon and judgment calls may have been the types of factors contributing to errors. The organizational issues attributed to this vulnerability included: machines were found with this software that should not have had the software running on it; some individuals may be using the software against the intent of the program, which may cause the vulnerability on the systems; and machines not administered by the group do not receive the upgrade. Solutions include making IP addresses of machines that had the vulnerability available to the maintainers of the system, so they may be able to impose some restrictions on it. In this capacity, administrators would be able to analyze who may not be following policy, and/or make necessary changes to the policy itself or to its deployment. Creating communication between the auditors of the system and its maintainers may help, so that the maintainers are aware of what needs to be done to restore security.
IMPLICATIONS OF HFVA
The issues uncovered in the pilot testing of the HFVA methodology have implications for future use of HFVA. Development work for HFVA evaluations includes three elements. First, more comprehensive technical vulnerability information is needed, such as a list of IP addresses and operating systems that will allow for more specific information regarding the use of machines with vulnerabilities. Specific information will yield more accurate information in the Analysis stage.
Second, analysis of administrator responsibilities and tasks in the organization is needed in order to match interviewee knowledge and expertise to vulnerability characteristics. The person or persons most closely related to the vulnerability will be providing the information for vulnerability analysis thereby supplying more complete information and fewer speculative comments. This information may include: specifying the operating system where the vulnerability is found (to match the administrator(s) responsible for particular operating systems), specify the machines where the vulnerability occurred (match administrator(s) that may be solely in charge of one particular group of users), and level of access required to manipulate the vulnerability (identifying end users who have access to the vulnerability as some administrators may be responsible for controlling access for groups).
Third, the definitions used for HFVA need to be checked for completeness. The "design" and "implementation" errors in the Identification stage need to be clarified. Before HFVA was pilot tested, this type of error was one in the same, but interviews revealed that "design" should be distinguished by the scheme of hardware/software, while "implementation" error is a bug or flaw in how the design was actually realized. This is an important distinction to make in the Identification stage, as it will drive the direction of the Analysis stage, i.e. whether the vulnerability will be assessed as a human error, a technical error, or both. Errors in design may or may not be within the realm of control of the organization, therefore guiding a purely technical analysis and solution. Errors occurring in design and/or implementation that are within the realm of the organizational control generate both technical and organizational analyses and solutions. This distinction may be one of the criteria for deciding how the vulnerability will be analyzed and solution is formulated, whether the vulnerability may be defined as a human or technical error, or both.
A feedback loop (i.e. a verification mechanism) may be introduced into the methodology which may include a review by a manager or peer group to verify or expand the responses given with the HFVA evaluation. Comparison of data logs, documentation of security procedures, and security policy to interviewee responses may also be used to supplement and verify the information gathered from an HFVA evaluation.
A pathway for analyzing the combination of technology and human error may be introduced in the model. The current model does not address the hybrid of technology and human errors in vulnerabilities. This pathway could take the form of analyzing the technical and human errors separately and performing a work system analysis of these issues in conjunction. This would provide a more complete and richer understanding of the work system mechanisms, and subsequently, how both work system and technical solutions will work together.
CONCLUSION
These findings constitute the further development of a more complete and comprehensive HFVA evaluation to be used in conjunction with technical security audits. This research provided a first step in identifying human factors issues in CIS, specifically from technical vulnerability audits. The intent of this methodology is to provide information to organizations interested in creating preventative security measures and tactics. The content of this information includes: generation of quality data that accurately recognizes and assesses the human factors components contributing to vulnerabilities and security as a whole, a framework that is accessible and relevant to organizations who want to create human factors solutions to their security problems, and specific data that may be categorized in a meaningful way so as to create the correct solutions to remedy vulnerabilities and security breaches. 
